Novum Aurora

August 1990 • J E R U S A L E M

_{Precious Stones}

| OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, KIRYAT HA-MEMSHALA - EVENING |

_{" And I will make thy pinnacles of rubies, and thy gates of radiant jewels, and all thy border of Avnei Chefetz (precious stones) " (Isaiah 54:12).}

In 1990, a group of Jewish Orthodox students 
from the West Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron 
established makeshift homes overlooking the 
Palestinian town of Shufa. Cristened Avnei 
Chefetz by the students, the creation of this 
outpost had been aided by Amana, a right-wing 
activist group promoting the development of Jewish 
communities in the occupied Arab territories. 
Members of the SHAMIR cabinet, faced with a 
settlement that was illegal under both Israeli 
and international law, debated a response. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

^{| Sprawled out on an oak table, a map of the West Bank partitioned by lines and hues illuminating a labyrinth of Jewish settlements, Arab towns, security checkpoints, Jewish and Palestinian-only roads — titled in bold font: CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA |}

| ^{Rafael EITAN,} _{AGRICULTURE MINISTER} | _{" This discussion is not about the students, nor is it even about their outpost. If we decide to legalise Avnei Chefetz, we will be setting a precedent that any religious Jew can plant a flag throughout the territories with the confidence that the government will give effect to that retroactively. If they move too freely, too aggressively, the intifada will last longer than necessary, and the entire legitimacy and security of the settlements will be undermined! "}

| ^{Yitzhak SHAMIR,} _{PRIME MINISTER} | _{" The fact is the settlements are there, and I will not remove them. We will not give an inch to the Arabs, intifada or not! Surely, we are confident in our ability to respond to increased Arab political violence in Judea and Samaria? "}

| ^{Moshe ARENS,} _{DEFENCE MINISTER} | _{" Militarily, yes. "}

| ^{Yitzhak SHAMIR,} _{PRIME MINISTER} | _{" From a diplomatic perspective? LEVY, what are the risks of recognition? "}

| ^{David LEVY,} _{FOREIGN MINISTER} | _{" I am against the recognition of unauthorised outposts, including Avnei Chefetz — the timing is simply not in our favour. Washington will interpret any such decision as undermining the spirit of the peace negotiations. "}

| ^{Yitzhak SHAMIR,} _{PRIME MINISTER} | _{" The Americans will give me an earful. However, sending the IDF to uproot these outposts would be a mistake. It would send the wrong signal to the Palestinian terrorists, the Arab regimes and the international community that Israel is willing to remove the settlements in exchange for no tangible concessions from the other side. That could weaken our position at the negotiating table. In any case, as a matter of principle, I will not authorise it— "}

^{| ZE'EVI interjects abruptly, changing the subject from any mention of Arab-Israeli negotiations |}

| ^{Rehavam ZE'EVI,} _{MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO} | _{" Removal would also undermine the entire political message of LIKUD! "}

| ^{Yitzhak SHAMIR,} _{PRIME MINISTER} | _{" It will be a disaster. When we face RABIN and PERES in the Knesset, in the polls, we will need the support of every species of right-wing voter. We are the party of security, of settlement, of redeeming the rights of the Jewish people — we need to project that message. I cannot proclaim these virtues while stifling the growth of new outposts. It would be impossible! Impossible, I say! "}

| ^{David LEVY,} _{FOREIGN MINISTER} | _{" Then we stay quiet on the matter. No overt recognition, but no removal ... we can obscure the matter in the language of security. "}

| ^{Yitzhak SHAMIR,} _{PRIME MINISTER} | _{" Yes, let these Jewish boys settle in peace! Why should they not settle in their homeland with the assistance of activists? We need more, not less, settlements — I cannot, will not, condemn these students! "}

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Confident that Avnei Chefetz would be sustained 
by non-governmental organisations, specifically 
Amana, the SHAMIR cabinet took no action on the 
matter. Between 1990 and 1991, the Jewish settler
population throughout the occupied Arab territories 
(including East JERUSALEM) grew by 15,000 — it was 
a record increase.

THE BLOODY STANDOFF AT KAUNUS TELEVISION TOWER

Around 07:19, 2 June 1990, Lithuanian rebels claiming to represent the separatist “terrorist” group “Sąjūdis” seized control of a small television tower in Kaunus of the Lithuanian SSR. The rebels took advantage of gaps in Soviet security forces, exploiting a window of opportunity to illegally seize control of the tower and deliver unauthorized transmissions.

At H+0057 minutes, OMON rapid response units as reinforcements of local security arrived. They encountered what were an estimated high hundreds of civilians guarding the tower. The OMON forces were unable to seize control of the tower, and were relegated to monitoring and de-escalating the situation before further reinforcements could arrive. At H+0097 minutes, mobile EW detachment units arrived and immediately began with signal suppression. Jamming the tower’s frequencies and ensuring a blackout of any further propaganda from Saljudis terrorists. The crowds guarding the tower grew even larger, to an estimated low thousands of people. They were observed constructing barricades, holding up protest signs, and engaging in verbal and physical aggression towards Soviet forces. Heavy reinforcements were requested, including armored vehicles and tanks.

Further units of OMON, Internal Troops, and KGB would arrive to the situation. Most notable is at H+0227 minutes, when the Soviet Airborne Forces (VDV) arrived through Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters.

As Soviet forces arrived, adequate warnings were given towards the protestors to leave at once, who formed barricades and human shields. The crowd was particularly belligerent and had continued to engage in aggressive verbal and physical actions. Non-lethal means such as tear gas, rubber bullets, and stun grenades were used as crowd dispersion tactics. Two tanks fired warning shots into the distance, signaling de-escalation. The crowd had become even more rowdy. The Commander at site then gave orders for an assault, rolling tanks over protestors and firing into the crowd. The order for pre-emptive force was especially due to the KGB and MVD reports confirming the presence of weapons and armament among the Sajudis militants.

Elite forces, after clearing a path, began storming into the tower to seize control of it. The battle was tense but short lived as the Sajudis defenders, while confirmed to have been armed, were unable to contend with the superior tactics, firepower, and training of Soviet special forces.

It is estimated that as a result of the encounter, around 37 fatalities and 517 injuries occurred on the Sajudis militant side while 9 Soviet men were lost to the rebel forces, and 31 were wounded.

This would mark a significant, bloody event in the State of Emergency of the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities, having fired upon the crowd and rolled armored vehicles over them, demonstrated their commitment to preserving the Union at all costs—a cause they are willing to draw blood over.

"There will be no compromises to the gains of the Revolution."

- Boris Karlovich Pugo

CURTAILING THE SPREAD OF HUMAN IMMUNO-DEFICIENCY VIRUS

There are around 543 registered cases of HIV/AIDS in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as of June 1990. HIV and AIDS has a small presence in the Soviet Union. The Soviet medical industry has mass produced HIV/AIDS test kits, leading to more than 24 million having been tested—roughly 8% of the population. Although this small presence of HIV and AIDS cannot continue without proper public health measures to further curtail its spread.

The most significant outbreak of HIV/AIDS occurred in Elista, capital of the Kalmyk Republic. Around 270 patients, primarily children, were infected with HIV subtype G in seventeen hospitals. The infection was transmitted through contaminated catheters and needles, which were improperly sterilized. Soviet authorities have repeatedly given warnings to the subsequent medical institutions of failing medical inspections, although repercussions are deemed to not have been punitive enough. The origins of this outbreak occurred with patient zero, a local radio engineer who worked in the Congo during the early 1980s. It is believed that his sexual debauchery with locals and Russians upon return played a factor in the spread of the disease.

To curtail the issue of the spread of HIV/AIDS, it will be decreed by the Ministry of Health as a “public health emergency” warranting expanded powers for immediate policy changes and implementations.

One of these measures will include immediate immigration restrictions. Of the 543 registered cases of HIV/AIDS, around 75% are foreign nationals rather than Soviet citizens. In lieu of the disease having foreign origins, Soviet authorities have proceeded with mandatory HIV testing for immigration into the Soviet Union, indiscriminately both foreign and Soviet nationals. Foreign nationals who test positive for HIV/AIDS are to be denied entry in the Soviet Union. Soviet nationals are to be placed under adequate quarantine.

Mass testing of HIV in the Soviet population is to continue, further identifying and rooting out potential carriers and outbreaks of HIV.

HIV/AIDS carry a stigma which may have impacts on the efficacy of rooting out the disease, especially due to discouraging people from getting tested to avoid such stigma. The Ministry of Health initially stated that HIV/AIDS was a virus of licentiousness and lax morality, and the lack of presence of HIV/AIDS in contrast to the west was a result of lower moral standards in the west spreading the disease. It additionally has a heavy attribution towards homosexuality. This initial stigmatization has been updated with the outbreak in Elista, although lingering sentiments may prove problematic.

The approach will continue to require refinement. Extreme stigmatization may be detrimental, but lax morality and licentiousness are a major factor to consider in its spread. The “at-risk” population of the Soviet Union remains lower than industrialized capitalist nations, though not non-existent. Soviet public health policy is to consider a balanced approach to the issue in combatting extreme stigmatization while discouraging deviant behaviors that place individuals at risk in the spread of HIV and AIDS. Emphasizing that while such deviant behaviours and lax morality increase the risk of its spread, there are numerous ways HIV can be transmitted and being a victim of HIV can easily occur without any wrongdoing—no assumptions should be made towards those who fall victim to HIV.

Soviet criminalization of homosexuality remains active, with high hundreds of cases every year. A “don’t ask don’t tell” policy will be implemented for the testing and monitoring of potential homosexuals to encourage testing for HIV without fear of criminalization, and legal adjustments that guarantee being positive for HIV cannot be used as evidence for homosexual activity. Although the active criminalization of homosexuality will see no changes.

Continued research is to be conducted on treatment, potential cures for HIV affected individuals, and preventative spread measures.

Currently, Soviet medical and economic policy for medical facilities requires the replacement of glass needles, sterilized between uses, to be completely superseded by disposable needles. Domestic production has fallen short of requirements and imported needles have been complicated by economic disruptions, both being especially due to the effects of perestroika. Economic difficulties, while having seen improvement, may continue to be a factor complicating the distribution of disposable needles. Although authorities are instructed to work diligently in addressing the public health crisis and ensuring the distribution of single use needles, and strict enforcement of needle sterilization where reusable needles are in short supply.

9 MONTHS INTO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY: BRIEF UPDATES

The Autumn Dawn
The incident at Kaunus television tower that resulted in a violent clash between Sajudis and Soviet authorities culminated in a chain reaction that set off a large wave of protests throughout the Baltic SSRs, with some spillover elsewhere in the Soviet Union. It initially, on the surface, appeared as if GKChP authorities may have gotten the situation completely under control with minor skirmishes. Yet the stability achieved by the GKChP was quite metastable and brittle. Security forces were overstretched, and such gaps were naturally exploited by rebel groups who are increasingly becoming better at exploiting said gaps and deficiencies. As such, a sudden wave of protests hit throughout the Baltic SSRs. Militant activity has reportedly increased, while morale has struggled among Soviet forces. Although an insurrection on the scale of the old forest brothers may prove to be difficult given that Baltic militants do not have the same access to weapons that was present immediately following the Second World War.

While Soviet authority remains firm in urban areas of the Baltics, passive resistance throughout the Baltics is widespread. Taking forms of protests, underground movements, boycotts, work slowdowns, and etc. To a lesser extent, these activities persist in western Ukraine and the Caucuses. In the forests and rugged terrain, armed militants gather around scheming guerilla tactics in preparation of a Soviet offensive looming on the horizon.

The Russian core, including eastern Ukraine and Belarus, is seeing declining resistance. Though it does continue to persist, especially as intellectual, student, and urban reformist activity, with residual unapproved gatherings.

The severe shortages during the latter months of Perestroika appear to have diminished with the GKChP’s forceful, perhaps brutal, restart of the Soviet planned economy. Although in many areas, especially with regards to luxury goods, they continue to persist. There is little sense of abundance or luxury. Many dissidents argue the regime is using brute force to hold together a flawed system, being patched with duct tape to mask its crumbling and deterioration.

The Return of Red Terror?
The State of Emergency remains in place as the situation is more “contained” than eliminated. At the helm is Boris Karlovich Pugo, a man renowned for an iron fist and clear commitment to preservation of the Soviet Union, with a background in the KGB and MVD. Pugo is widely accredited among hardliners as an effective and disciplined leader, keeping the Union preserved and even inviting newfound energy and competence. Though in the eyes of dissidents, Pugo is seen in a very nefarious and negative light.

The preservation of the Soviet Union and the system remaining in place despite massive upheavals is not something that was done without a significant cost in repression. Under Boris Pugo and the GKChP, dissidents are reporting a “second round of Stalinist terrors.” The sharashka system has quietly re-emerged, a form of gulags centered around intellectual rather than manual labor that existed in the 1920s to 1950s but disappeared under the Khrushchev thaw. Now, it has returned under the rule of the GKChP. It has been accompanied by mass arrests carried out against intellectual and dissident circles.

Additionally, mass deportations are being carried out in regions of “high rebelliousness,” in a very eerie and uncanny remembrance of the Stalinist era. It is most visible in the Baltic states, though there are some reports of smaller scale deportations in western Ukraine and the Caucuses. An estimated tens of thousands of “problematic” Baltic populations have been forcibly loaded onto trains and sent into “secure facilities” in remote areas of the Soviet Union—primarily Siberia. Brutality is increasingly apparent in interactions between Soviet forces and dissidents, with rules of engagement set by the central government being increasingly disobeyed as encounters grow tense and bitter, as local commanders prioritize enforcing Soviet authority.

Anywhere from 8000 to 10000 individuals have been sentenced to death, reaching almost a third of all executions that have occurred in the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1989. The GKChP has demonstrated its commitment to the preservation of unyielding Soviet socialism at a tremendous cost of blood, brutality, and terror. Although its advocates suggest that the scale of brutality would be made even worse if the demands of reformists were met, as it would culminate in the eventual dissolution and balkanization of the Soviet Union. Such may be evident by the fighting that broke out between the Armenian and Azeri SSRs.

Student Protests
1989 has been a year marked by a global wave of revolutions across the globe. Another case that often draws analogies to the USSR is that of the Tiananmen Square protests in the People’s Republic of China. Though the hopes of a mass, student-driven Red Square protests have not occurred. Soviet authorities have prevented any such large scale demonstrations, while the political leadership post coup is firmer and more resolute than the internal power struggles in the Chinese Communist Party. Regardless, this has been more of a containment than an absolute prevention. As the new academic year of the Soviet higher education system begins, large-scale student protests are occurring throughout the Union. While not a centralized gathering reminiscent of Tiananmen Square, it is perhaps even larger in absolute scale, though physically scattered. Dissident students have organized mass demonstrations including but not limited to rallies, petitions, speeches, sit-ins. Soviet authorities continue to use crowd dispersion tactics and rules of engagement to keep the situation at bay, although reports of violent clashes continue to emerge.

Increased demographic tension has been of note. In areas of high separatism such as the Baltics, there is the obvious and popular narrative of “Sovietized Russian control suppressing our native culture.” Inside the Slavic core is another set of socioeconomic and demographic discrepancies. Avoiding the dilemma of “firing upon their own people,” Soviet authorities have largely kept urban intellectual and dissident circles at bay with young men from rural or industrial areas, Siberia, and Central Asia. Fueling the narrative of the “privileged, weak, wannabe-bourgeois decadent urban elites sabotaging the Union and your own prosperity” towards said individuals. This has generated reciprocal resentment among dissident urban elites who detest the government’s use of “outsiders” to rough them up.

The student movement is led by a loud, organized minority of youth who take substantial influences from western counterculture and the underground. Partaking in “forbidden” cultural trends, lifestyles, and music such as punk, rock and roll, and wearing jeans. The majority of Soviet students continue to go about their day quietly, preferring to see the situation resolved rather than commit to the risks of dissident political engagement.

What is next for the Soviet Union?
Analysts and Soviet insiders expected the GKChP to deliver a remarkable clean up of the Soviet Union and then aspire back towards its old prestige, at least once it was clear that the hardline coup succeeded. Yet the situation proved to be more brittle than many had assumed. The Baltic states continue to be belligerent and resist Soviet rule. The start of a new academic year has energized youth dissidents. Security forces are overworked and stretched thin The future of the Soviet Union remains precarious. Even if the State of Emergency is resolved, leading the Soviet Union to the end of the century and into a new millennium in the current state that it’s in, may prove to be a tremendously difficult task.

THE NEW ECONOMIC PLAN OF THE SOVIET UNION
January 1991

The State of Soviet Socialism in 1991
The last few months were characterized by an anomalous interval of the Soviet economy, where Gosplan did not have a traditional Five Year Plan but was tasked with brute-force restarting the Soviet planned economy, which began unraveling due to the failed economic policies under Perestroika. The GKChP has led the Soviet government and security forces in the reinforcement of central planning and the guiding role of the Communist Party, preventing the Union from a further economic downward spiral. This entailed force, manifesting as mass arrests and executions, but largely succeeded in its goals—albeit with limitations.

The “Law on Cooperatives” was mostly overturned. The initial policy, in effect, conducted an accidental and near-complete liberalization of economic control by the Communist Party—a major destabilizing force. Under the GKChP, cooperatives were not completely outlawed. Rather, some productive cooperatives were co-opted if they could productively assist in fulfilling light industry and consumer goods distribution or needs. Others were shut down and reined in. The guiding authority of the Communist Party and Gosplan was re-asserted in the Soviet economy. Independent banking and finance was completely shut out. Foreign trade was taken back from nefarious actors, reinforcing the state monopoly on foreign trade dating back to Lenin. Although in all cases, there are various degrees of grey or black market economic activity in the shadows.

The liberalization of certain belligerent Warsaw Pact states (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania), while reducing Soviet geopolitical influence and security, has yielded some immediate and notable economic benefits. Previously, the Soviet Union had terms of trade with these nations that were unfavorable to itself. Many Soviet officials or commoners complained about these states being sinkholes of Soviet subsidization and assistance for comparatively less economic gain in return. With their rejection of Communism and deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, Moscow has proceeded with setting more profitable market-based economic dealings that removed the COMECON pricing formulas which priced Soviet exports below market prices. This has both improved the Soviet financial and trade situation, and assisted in solving agricultural problems due to a lesser need of supplying Soviet agricultural produce to countries such as Poland.

The GKChP and hardliners in the Soviet government have largely achieved their goals. The Soviet planned economy has been restarted, and a degree of stability has returned. To much of the Soviet population, Boris Pugo and his allies have earned the reputation as strong and patriotic leaders who rose up in a time of crisis to save the Union from traitors both internal and external.

While the stability and continued existence of the Soviet Union and its socialist system seems to have been largely secured over the past year, whether or not the Soviet Union will thrive and continue on as a successful superpower remains to be seen.

The State of Emergency and “elevated security measures” still remain in place, which has produced a somewhat tense environment throughout the Union but is keeping up a degree of stability. Outside observers and critics harshly rebuke the Soviet Union for effectively being a “military junta”.

Internal Factions
Only a portion of the work in reinvigorating the Soviet Union has been completed. The GKChP is now faced with the monumental task of leading the Soviet Union from the State of Emergency back into regular civilian rule, and setting the course for socialism in the millennium to come.

The prevailing views of top Soviet officials can be categorized into a spectrum of three categories: neo-Stalinism, Andropov-style conservatism, or economic reformism under an authoritarian government. The neo-Stalinist view would call for hardline measures to reinvigorate the revolution and purge the Soviet Union of revisionist fifth columnists, with some younger voices calling for a cultural revolution. Andropov-style conservatives would advocate for a more cautious move, preserving and reinforcing the Soviet system but in a more conservative manner and avoiding a return to “mass terror.” Reformists would strongly rebuke the excesses of Gorbachev but suggest the Soviet economy should undergo carefully planned market oriented reforms while maintaining an authoritarian grip over the economy and system. A fourth faction could be considered in the Brezhnevite old guard, though they could be more accurately classified as bureaucratic inertia and are increasingly losing power as their position becomes increasingly unsustainable.

Viktor Alksnis and Nina Andreyeva, notorious for her 1988 anti-reform manifesto, are some of the staunchest advocates for the neo-Stalinist path. Vladimir Kryuchkov would promote a more cautious conservatism. Boris Pugo, the leader of the Soviet Union, settled on a compromise between the neo-Stalinists and conservatives while sidelining the reformists.

The New Five Year Plan
The Thirteenth Five Year Plan (13-5) has now been approved by the highest organs of Soviet authority, including the GKChP, and is now being implemented through the State Planning Committee (Gosplan).

This is not a typical Five Year Plan, continuing Soviet economic business and development as usual. Amidst the situation that the nation finds itself in, the thirteenth plan will inevitably be an identity-defining turning point for the future of the Soviet Union. What will the socialist experiment look like in the next few years and new millennium? What will the new FYP do to address the troubles of the Union?

13-5 is officially called the “Plan of Precision and Electronics.” The plan can be summarized as a mobilization of the Union’s resources towards the development of a new type of planned economy, one characterized by computerization and “modernization.” Substantial amounts of resources and funds will be directed towards this goal, capitalizing on the documented strength of the Soviet planned economy to name a goal and mobilize the nation towards achieving that. With previous successes having been in areas such as electrification, Stalinist industrialization, and the space program.

13-5 coincides with the creation of the “State Commission for Cybernetics” (Государственная комиссия по кибернетике) or SCC (ГКК) for short. A central coordinating body for the Union’s computing and microfabrication related technologies, coordinating and centralizing the disorganized and scattered competing sub-ministries which currently handle the Soviet computing and microfabrication industry—solving the political problem of poor organization of the industry.

Under 13-5, the SCC will be tasked with facilitating and enforcing the expansion or new construction of objects such as wafer plants, cleanrooms, photomask shops, testing lines, precision machinery, component plants, and computer assembly facilities. Computer labs will be opened up throughout educational institutions and libraries, expanding the accessibility of computing to much of the Soviet population.

The acceleration of computing in the Soviet Union will be incomplete without an emphasis on improvements in precision and microfabrication, improving the Soviet Union’s ability for finer manufacturing and engineering needed for the continued development of computing, and improvements in automation. Freeing up labor and resources for further industrial modernization.

A key reform towards meeting these goals will be major changes towards the culture and system behind incentives and previous quota or plan fulfillment. Previously, managers were sometimes incentivized to keep production up at the cost of equipment and machinery upgrades. Major changes and overhauls will be made, permitting dips in production and quota fulfillment if accompanied by upgrades on the factory floor and machinery. Phasing out inefficient practices and industrial processes in favor of modernization and automation—through means such as industrial robotic implementation and the increased use of advanced numerical control machines. In a very radical break with previous norms, 13-5 will focus very little on the raw increase of many industrial metrics by focusing on efficiency and automation. The Soviet Union is currently the world’s largest economy by industrial volume, producing more steel, metals, railroads, jet engines, and rockets than even the United States. Amidst this superiority of volume but a lag in precision manufacturing, it is deemed wise to instead focus on upgrades towards precision and automation.

Viktor Alksnis, a current member of the GKChP and leader of the hardline Soyuz faction in the Supreme Soviet, was a prominent architect and voice in the establishment of this plan. Especially after his famous visit with Anatoly Kitov and other leading scientists or engineers in cybernetics.

The Grand Future of the Soviet Union
Overall, the thirteenth Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union is a stepping stone towards the transition of the Soviet Union into a renewed and modernized socialist superpower. Investing in the capabilities needed for transitioning the outdated Soviet economic engine towards a modern, cybernetic socialist economy. Towards the general population, the pioneers of the Thirteenth Five Year Plan and its ambitious restructuring of the Soviet economy argue that it will produce a Soviet economy that can far more efficiently meet and improve the living standards of the Soviet people—even if the mobilization towards electronics appears as monomania.