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The Ten Commandments

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The Ten Commandments also known as the Decalogue,
are a set of biblical principles relating to ethics and worship
that play a fundamental role in Judaism and Christianity.
The text of the Ten Commandments appears twice in the Hebrew Bible:
at Exodus 20:2–17 and Deuteronomy 5:6–21.

The Ten Commandments, from which we believe all of the 613 commandments of Israelitic law are derived, can be categorized in several ways. They reflect three types of precepts—those of the heart, tongue, and hand (act). The first five commandments deal with the relations between man and God (all of the first five have God's name in them), and the second with relations between man and man. In the first two commandments God refers directly to Himself in the first person, and in the other eight he refers to Himself in the third person. Further, they are divided into positive obligations and negative rules, and are arranged on two tablets. They also appear in two places in the Torah: Exodus 20:2–14, and Deuteronomy 5:6–18. The two versions of the verses are not identical and thus provide a rich source for commentary.

The last admonition––do not covet––is called the "most puzzling of all the Ten Commandments, which is a prohibition applying to the sphere of thought and feeling." On its face, the offense of coveting is a completely mental crime, without a trace of actus reus. It is even less than an omission, which, under certain circumstances, can be
punished. In our law failure to perform a positive commandment can be punished only if it is open and brazen. Thus, the Ten Commandments encompass the entire gamut
of wrongdoing acts, words, omissions, and thoughts.

There is of course another completely mental crime in the Ten Commandments—the first one which simply says "I am the Lord your God, Who delivered you from the land of Egypt, from the house of slavery." It is framed as a statement rather than an order.

Many traditional commentators, however, interpret it as a positive commandment to believe in God. Thus, while it is a mental crime––a precept of the heart––it is an affirmative obligation, whereas the admonition against coveting is a negative commandment. Nonetheless, the First Commandment, to believe in God, is not as moving as much as the prohibition against coveting because it is natural for the Giver of the Law Who performed miracles and redeemed the Israelitic people from slavery, to demand belief in His existence and power. As with coveting, it is a completely mental offense, addressed to the hidden mind, heart and soul. Thus, mental crimes introduce and end the Ten Commandments, which in Hebrew are called the Aseret Ha Dibrot, literally, the ten statements, or words, or sayings. As we shall see, however, despite their seeming polarity, there is a strong connection between the two.

Israelites are constantly asked to examine their behavior as well as thoughts that may ultimately lead to harm, and, therefore, as the old joke goes, we all suffer from varying
degrees of guilt, a not unexpected result when our law imposes 613 commandments, some positive, some negative, and some thankfully not required outside of Israel, or in
modern times, or are applicable only to certain people. The prohibition against coveting is even more problematic when viewed in the context of our criminal law. It is almost impossible to convict anyone of a crime in the rabbinic courts, whether they are innocent or guilty. Two competent witnesses must observe the actor about to commit the crime, admonish him as to the consequences if he completes the act, and he, in turn, must verbally acknowledge the witness' warnings, and then go on to commit the crime in their presence. Confessions are inadmissible, no matter how voluntary; even guilty pleas are prohibited. There is no accomplice liability and circumstantial evidence is worthless.

Furthermore, just as in other legal systems, the defendant must commit an act, the whole act––attempts are not cognizable. Words are not considered an act unless the words themselves are prohibited, such as inciting people to worship idols. Given that backdrop, the prohibition against coveting seems even more disparate. Yet there is a value in prohibiting this mental offense. It is the ultimate deterrence to bad acts, and indeed it is argued that all crimes stem from coveting. If one must root out the fantasy, thought, wish, desire or intent, the likelihood of turning the thoughts into fixed plans and then into actions such as theft or robbery or murder or rape becomes much less likely. Still, the lack of actus reus and the legal apparatus that would be needed to enforce this law makes for some uneasiness. But as it turns out, however, the concerns about the lack of actus reus for coveting is not as dangerous as it seems. In Deuteronomy 7:25 God told our Israelite people that when they occupy the Holy Land, we should burn the graven images of other gods, and admonished that "you shall not covet and take for yourself the silver and gold that is on them, lest you be ensnared by it." Since the word "covet" is followed by the action of "take for yourself," commentators argue that the word covet in the Ten Commandments is similarly circumscribed. In accordance with this view, the Sefer Ha Hinnuch, a thirteenth century commentary on the commandments, notes that the ban on coveting is not "truly, finally broken until some action is taken about it." That does not, however, completely solve the problem.

Recollect, that the Decalogue is given twice. Thus the prohibition against coveting is written once in Exodus 20:14 and once in Deuteronomy 5:18. The Hebrew word used for covet in Exodus 20:14 is tachmod. In Deuteronomy 5:18 the commandment reads: "And you shall not covet (tachmod) your fellow's wife, you shall not desire (titaveh) your fellow's house,…." Some commentators note the distinction and ascribe different meanings to the two words. Desire is in the heart, whereas covet requires an action. This is learned from biblical sources. We have already noted that covet in Deuteronomy 7:25 is followed by the word "take," connoting action. The meaning of the word titaveh in Deuteronomy 20:18 is learned from Deuteronomy 12:20: "when your soul desires (titaveh) meat."

Maimonides follows this distinction in his book The Commandments. In the volume dealing with negative commandments, Maimonides gives two separate commandments dealing with the issue of wanting what others have. In commandment 265, entitled "Planning to Acquire Another's Property," he says:

The upshot is that, according to Maimonides and many other commentators,there is a prohibition against mere desire, without a need for an act. In light of the strictness of our criminal law, why do we take this position?

A modern commentator on the 613 commandments, Rabbi Chill, follows Maimonides and also breaks the sin of coveting into two categories. In the first scenario, the person desires another's possessions, but he is merely daydreaming or fantasizing. That violates the commandment in thought but not act. In the second case, there is coveting, but the actor attempts to talk the owner into giving up his possessions, or even to use undue influence to persuade the owner to sell the article. That is a violation of the sin of coveting in deed. If the covetor goes on to steal the article, he is guilty of three offenses: "envy in thought, envy in deed, and theft."

Another commentator argues that the difference between the words tachmod and titaveh is that the latter refers to desire regarding an object without having seen it, whereas tachmod applies to one whose desire is stimulated by seeing the object. On the other hand, the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol says flatly that tachmod and titaveh "mean the same thing." The latter's difficulty is if one accepts that there is a difference between tachmod and titaveh, it means that wanting someone's house is worse than wanting someone's wife, which is somewhat problematic. On the other hand, they are not absolute synonyms. Torah scholars spend their lives parsing words and even letters in the Torah to derive the true meaning. Why should the Torah use two different words unless it sheds some light on what God is trying to communicate? Therefore, there must be a reason for God to prohibit mere naked desire of another's goods.

One possible answer is that given by Maimonides—to prevent the progression from thought to scheme to action. Maimonides claims that mere desire will lead to coveting and then to robbery. In Maimonides's Code on the Mishnah Torah he also makes the above distinction, but then goes on to note that if the owner resists the covetor's attempt to rob him, the covetor will then be led to bloodshed. In this view, God is creating a fence around the Torah prohibitions against evil acts, pushing the fence far back, beyond attempts or conspiracy. Many rabbinic laws, perhaps in imitation of God, are promulgated for the same reason. For example, the Torah prohibits certain activities on the Sabbath. The Rabbis then decreed that one is not permitted to handle objects which, if used for its purpose, will result in violating the Sabbath. So one cannot handle a pencil or pen because one might come to write with it and thus desecrate the Sabbath.

Another reason is to provide proof that the Torah comes from God. It is clear that violation of a "thought crime" cannot be punished by the human courts. Judgment must then be up to God, since He would not impose a law which cannot be enforced. We know that God can judge guilt to a hair's breadth, unlike the human courts, and will not over or under punish us. As Rabbi Samson Hirsch noted, the prohibition against coveting is itself proof that the Torah comes from God. Human kings and rulers can only punish deeds, that which is seen, but God can read our most intimate thoughts and therefore the prohibition against coveting is there to tell us of God's omniscience. What God prohibits, God can punish. He leaves deeds to the human courts and thoughts to Himself.

The commandment against coveting has yet a deeper thrust. When God tells us not to covet, it is incumbent upon us to try to root out the envy we feel. We can do this by physical means, such as banging our heads against a wall, or running around and screaming to get rid of the idea, or we can do it intellectually, by reasoning and exercising faith in God who decreed that we should not have that which we want, thus creating a connection between the First and Tenth Commandments. If one believes in God, he will not transgress any of His commandments. Being covetous is thus a sign of a lack of faith in God.

Furthermore, by prohibiting coveting, God demonstrates that humans have control over their feelings and emotions and intellect, not just their acts, and can sanctify their
thoughts until they are pure. If that were not true, God would not have promulgated the Tenth Commandment. It is a belief of traditional Judaism that God is good, and when He
tells us to do or not to do something, we have the power to obey, and if we do not, we are punished accordingly. As the Sefer Ha Chinuch stated: "Man is fully capable of quelling his desires, and it is up to him to decide what to seek out and what to reject. His will is his own. He directs it wherever he wishes." In other words, the dictate against coveting is a sign of man's free will at the highest level of abstract thought and desire. Just as we can prevent ourselves from the act of stealing, we can drive out evil thoughts.

Thus, God's determination to prohibit coveting creates a new class of commandments:

Biblical Sources

Two legal precepts expressed in the first five books of the Old Testament (also known as the Torah or Chumash) are the textual source of the rule in Israelitic law barring self-incriminating testimony. According to Deuteronomy 19:15:

Read literally, this verse would seem to be concerned solely with preventing conviction based on consanguinity. Rashi the master commentator on the Torah and the Talmud, tells us, however, that, on the authority of the oral tradition, the Sages interpreted the law as also relating to the exclusion of testimony by relatives. The Rabbis went on to ask, who is closer to a person than himself? And they concluded that the accused was his own kinsman and that his own confession was consequently precluded in criminal matters.

Taken together then, these two passages from Deuteronomy afford a Scriptural basis for the proposition that the testimony of the accused could not be included in determining whether there were the prescribed number of witnesses necessary to establish guilt. Therefore, even if there was one witness or other evidence corroborative of the defendant's guilt, his confession remained inadmissible.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of this examination of sources is that such an important rule of law is left to be deduced rather than being explicitly stated in the Torah. A subsidiary question is why the rule against self-incrimination is derived from the broad requirement of two witnesses to convict and the more specific prohibition against testimony by kinsmen.

Why the bar against confessions was left to be deduced is ultimately unknowable. It is part of the larger question of the basis for the division between Written and Oral Law
in Judaism, that is, why "[w]ords were given orally and words were given in writing." We do know, however, that the Chumash is concise, with no wasted words. According to
the Rabbis, everything that is there, is there to teach us. One of Scripture's pedagogical techniques is to require the derivation of rules from text. That very process enables the
reader to gain a deeper understanding of the Torah. Thus, although explicit statements of the law in the Chumash may arguably be of greater legal weight, for the individual
student the implicit is not necessarily less important than the explicit. On the contrary, that which must be elicited by painstaking study, analysis and comparison, may be considered more valuable than a specifically articulated directive. In this sense, the bar against self-incrimination is not merely an important evidentiary rule, but also a valuable
tool for teaching and learning.

The question why the self-incrimination prohibition was derived in part from the two-witness rule––or, stated another way, why the two-witness rule is explicit and the prohibition implicit––can be answered both logically and philosophically. The two-witness requirement is a broad law of general applicability, a basic prerequisite for criminal conviction. It is a positive enactment that is at the core of the Jewish system of criminal justice. The prohibition against self-incrimination, on the other hand, is a more specific evidentiary provision, precluding admissibility of a particular type of testimony. While admittedly reflecting a basic philosophical view concerning the extent to which the individual is required or permitted to assist the government in its prosecution of him, it is ultimately a negative command on which the rest of the system is not logically dependent. Although both the two-witness rule and the bar against inculpatory statements may be viewed as means of assuring reliability in the fact-finding process, the reliability effected by the two-witness rule is all-embracing, whereas the trustworthiness attained by virtue of the prohibition against confessions relates to its more limited context. Thus, while the overarching two-witness rule provides a framework within which the privilege easily rests, the two-witness rule could not have been derived from the bar against inculpatory statements. At the same time, the two-witness rule, as interpreted by the rabbis, defined society's expectations of its members' obligations in the criminal process, but perhaps on an even more fundamental level than the prohibition against confessions. Using the two-witness rule as a springboard, the Sages made it extremely difficult to convict anyone of a crime and thereby affirmed the sanctity of each individual's life, no matter how evil his conduct might appear. Accordingly, although the no-confession precept does not flow inexorably from the two-witness rule, its derivation is neither strained nor illogical.

It may be harder to ascertain the appropriate connection between the prohibition against confessions and the kinsmen testimonial rule. To be sure, once one accepts the validity of the kinsmen rule, it is not irrational to assert that the prohibition against self-incriminating statements is an extension of it. Presumably the same grounds for regarding a kinsman's testimony as inadmissible would apply to the ultimate kinsman, that is, the accused himself. Indeed, both the kinsmen rule and the prohibition arguably share
common concerns of privacy. Nevertheless, in some ultimate sense the suspect's confession can be viewed as sui generis, at least if one accepts the conventional wisdom
that only the accused knows for sure. Certainly, in terms of impact, a confession is one of the most persuasive kinds of evidence in a criminal trial. From that perspective, the basis
for derivation of the prohibition against admissions from the kinsmen testimonial bar remains unclear.

The question then is why a relative's testimony is made inadmissible. The argument that kinsmen are barred from testifying because of their natural bias in favor of the accused is belied by the rule's prohibition of such testimony both for and against the defendant. Furthermore, the Mishnah's specific rejection of a similar rule of disqualification for unrelated friends and enemies of the suspect suggests that prejudice of the witness either in favor of or against the defendant may not have been the underlying rationale for disqualification of kinsmen. On the other hand, the kinsmen prohibition may reflect a basic distinction in this regard between relatives and friends—a view that, unlike bias based on friendship, family prejudices in either direction are simply too deep-seated to be overcome. Moreover, friendship is subjective, and in a small community or tribal setting, it might encompass so many people that few would remain eligible to testify if all friends are barred, whereas consanguinity is an objective criterion whose application can be more easily contained. Testimony of a friend has a limited social impact, for the most part affecting only a particular relationship, while testimony by a relative may disrupt an entire family unit. However that may be, the traditional teaching is that the rule barring familial testimony is a decree, that is, a law whose rational basis cannot be discerned by human beings. That the transcendent rule against self-incrimination is left to inference, and was ultimately derived in part from a law based on divine fiat is, depending on one's point of view, either sublimely reassuring or intellectually disquieting.

The Torah teaches, moreover, that while a person is unique, he or she is not an isolated organism adrift in the mass of humanity, but rather a link in a genetic chain that transmits character and characteristics. Natural human egocentricity might nonetheless lead us to think that the family-based kinsman rule would be inferred from the individualistic prohibition against self-inculpatory statements. Such a deduction, however, would be quite difficult to make. The opposite derivation, which reasons from the kinsman rule to the prohibition by way of the intermediate thought that a person is most closely "related" to himself, is simpler, albeit not easy. This way of tracing the linkage between family and self—between the rule against kinsmen's testimony and the prohibition against self-incrimination—may also be seen as a means of reinforcing the biblical teaching that who you are depends at least in part on who your forebears were. Thus, the seemingly paradoxical derivation may be designed to help us view ourselves from this broader familial perspective. What may therefore initially be regarded as no more than a series of antiquated and hyper-technical rules revolving around consanguinity, may upon reflection be understood as delineating the relationship of the individual to the family, and as providing the source of one of the most fundamental rules defining the individual's relationship to the state.

We may ask one final question about these biblical roots of the prohibition: Why is it necessary to derive the prohibition against confessions from two verses rather than one? To the extent that the two-witness requirement is based on reliability concerns, the ban against confessions, like its source in the two-witness rule, reflects an interest in the trustworthiness of the fact-finding process. At the same time, although the kinsmen rule may also have a reliability aspect, it manifests privacy concerns as well, and the self-incrimination law may likewise reflect a privacy value. Thus, the multiplicity of sources suggests a multidimensional facet to the ban on confessions. Taking this hypothesis a
step further, even if an absolute bar against inculpatory statements is deemed unnecessary to assure trustworthiness in all cases, as in the case of a fully corroborated confession, for example, core privacy concerns still afford a basis for the unparalleled scope of our rule against self-incrimination.

The point of this somewhat oblique passage is that even though many court procedures applied in both criminal and civil cases, the Rabbis have determined that the prohibition against self-incrimination is not within this category; consequently, one who admits injuring another person is thereby liable to pay compensatory damages. In concluding that the prohibition against confessions does not apply in this civil context, the above statement suggests that the rule precluding self-inculpatory statements in criminal cases is well established.

Similarly, in examining whether the testimony of a single witness can require a defendant to take an oath in a civil case, another tannaitic text states, almost as an aside,
that even though a defendant cannot join together with another witness to make himself guilty of a crime, the defendant by his own admission can render himself liable for an oath in civil cases in certain instances. Again, the prohibition against confessions in the criminal arena is taken for granted.

Another affirmation, albeit indirect, of the rule barring confessions in criminal matters appears in an early tannaitic discussion of admissions in cases involving fines. In such proceedings, for example, an action against a thief to recover a multiple of the value of the stolen goods, a confession generally renders the defendant immune from liability for the fine. On the other hand, an admission of indebtedness in a garden-variety civil monetary proceeding, such as an action on a promissory note, is treated as a binding concession of liability, the tannaitic maxim being that admission of an obligation is equivalent to the testimony of one hundred witnesses.

Criminal cases thus appear to occupy the middle ground in the tannaitic legal world. The effect of confessions in civil cases involving monetary compensation is to render the defendant absolutely liable, whereas with regard to penalties the effect is generally the opposite, namely, immunization. It is only in criminal proceedings that the admission of the accused is not made dispositive. It is rather, in a sense, completely disregarded. The accused who confesses is neither immunized nor found guilty on that basis; instead, if there is sufficient extrinsic evidence—two witnesses—he could be convicted notwithstanding his confession.

One way to explain the differing evidentiary rules in civil, criminal, and fine proceedings is as a function of the varieties of judicial authority under our law. In cases in which a court has to determine ab initio whether liability exists, it is exercising true judicial power, and therefore the strict evidentiary rules governing such proceedings, including the prohibition against self-incrimination, are operative. Where, however, the court is sitting as a ratifying body, merely confirming preexisting obligations that can be objectively established, its status is more akin to that of an enforcement agency. Some of the evidentiary rules are therefore relaxed, and as a result, admissions that establish such preexisting liability are received in evidence.

Thus, a defendant is permitted to testify against himself in a civil case involving mere monetary restitution because the court is, in theory, making an objective decision about entitlement to property. Such a ruling arguably does no more than confirm the existence of the debt, which is in turn based on the acts of the parties themselves. If, for example, the defendant borrows money from the plaintiff, at that time, and by that act, the obligation to repay comes into being. A court order requiring payment of this preexisting liability on the basis of an admission does not constitute punishment. It simply recognizes that this is what the defendant owed.

In criminal proceedings, by contrast, a defendant's alleged offense does not render him liable until a judgment of conviction issued from a competent tribunal after a trial held in accordance with prescribed substantive, procedural and evidentiary rules. In criminal cases, therefore, since the court is creating liability where none existed before, the defendant's confession cannot be received in evidence. The adjudication of fines also fits within this framework and provides a helpful analogue. Like criminal prosecutions, these cases involve the imposition of punishment, or at least a form of punishment, for misconduct, on the basis of a judicial determination establishing liability. So, for example, a thief's admission of wrongdoing is sufficient to enable the court to enter a judgment in favor of the victim for compensatory damages (a purely civil monetary claim for the value of the stolen article), but could not be the foundation for a fine based on a multiple of the value of the stolen item. In these circumstances, the thief's obligation to pay the fine theoretically does not exist until the court enters a judgment to that effect. In other words, the court can be seen as creating rather than confirming liability, thus exercising true judicial authority, and consequently a confession cannot impose an obligation on the defendant to pay the penalty.

It may appear curious to treat confessions more generously in fine cases than in criminal matters, but close examination of the nature of these suits suggests several bases for such differing treatment. Penalty cases involve serious infractions that might lead to even more dangerous acts. Although the fine goes to the victim, its primary purpose is to purify the wrongdoer. The latter's confession of guilt and concomitant repentance can be viewed as achieving that end. In such a situation, the victim is made whole by compensatory damages, and the additional fine can be considered superfluous. Moreover, since as a result of restitution and confession, the defendant has arguably fulfilled both his secular and his spiritual obligation, immunization with respect to the fine may be viewed as consistent with the Scriptural requirement that punishment be "according to the measure of [the wrongdoer's] wickedness.

From a contemporary vantage point, remission of the fine may appear to be a dramatic example of underkill, since the wrongdoing involved is in some instances quite grave, rape, for example. But, in certain circumstances, other national laws are also willing to consider more lenient measures—probation—even as to such serious wrongs, in order to make the punishment fit the criminal and his crime. In addition, it is necessary to take into account that the Talmud's starting point in this case is the Bible, and that as to the offenses in question, Scripture established fines as the appropriate sanctions. Given this frame of reference, leniency in a deserving case meant forgiveness of the penalty altogether.

With respect to criminal conduct, however, the Torah has established a different benchmark. Offenses warranting capital punishment or flogging generally must to be viewed as more serious. In such cases, therefore, purification of the offender requires more severe means than those used in connection with violations punishable by fine. To assure expiation, punishment is prescribed notwithstanding the defendant's confession and contrition. Moreover, as a practical matter, to allow confessing defendants in criminal cases to be immunized, even though there is independent evidence sufficient to establish guilt, would undercut the deterrent effect of sanctions. Malefactors might then commit crimes in the hope that their later insincere confessions would be deemed genuine acts of penitence precluding punishment.

Despite the need for an effective deterrent, however, even in criminal cases, leniency is the order of the day. The Sages effectively limit the application of criminal sanctions by close adherence to procedural rules, by strict interpretation of the substantive elements of offenses, and by mitigation of the severity of punishment. These barriers to the imposition of sanctions in criminal cases may be viewed as the functional counterpart of immunity in fine proceedings.

Thus, the varying treatment of admissions in criminal and penalty cases may turn on the extent to which confession can serve an expiatory function. In the less serious context of fines, confessions may serve as an expiatory device, and so lead to immunization. In criminal proceedings, however, confessions are not allowed to be used as either a snare or an escape hatch for the accused. Inculpatory statements are instead made completely inadmissible.

The lex talionis appears in three different places in the Bible: Exodus 21:23–25, Leviticus 24:19–20, and Deuteronomy 19:18–21.1 Although the contexts are different, the wording is almost identical: "Life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth," and so forth. Read literally, the verses may appear to reflect the concept of lex talionis. Indeed, the "measure for measure" law of retaliation is found in the pre-Sinaitic Hammurabi Code, where it is explicit:

At the time of His walking the earth (Jesus), striking backhand a person deemed to be of lower socioeconomic class was a means of asserting authority and dominance. If the persecuted person "turned the other cheek," the discipliner was faced with a dilemma: The left hand was used for unclean purposes, so a back-hand strike on the opposite cheek would not be performed. An alternative would be a slap with the open hand as a challenge or to punch the person, but this was seen as a statement of equality. Thus, by turning the other cheek, the persecuted demanded equality; as for handing over one's cloak in addition to one's tunic: the debtor has given the shirt off his back, a situation forbidden by our law as stated in Deuteronomy (24:10–13); by giving the lender the cloak as well, the debtor was reduced to nakedness. Note that public nudity is viewed as bringing shame on the viewer, and not just the naked, as seen in Noah's case (Genesis 9:20–23). The succeeding verse is a method for making the oppressor break the law: the commonly invoked and nationally adopted Roman law of Angaria allowed the authorities to demand that inhabitants of territories carry messages and equipment the distance of one mile post for social superiors, but prohibited forcing an individual to go further than a single mile, at the risk of suffering disciplinary actions. In this example, the nonviolent interpretation sees Jesus as placing criticism on an unjust and hated laws, as well as clarifying the teaching to extend beyond our religious law.

King Jesus was not changing the meaning of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth", but restoring it to the original context. The Redeemer starts his statement with "you have heard it said," which could mean that he was clarifying a misconception, as opposed to "it is written", which can be seen as a reference to scripture. The common misconception seems to be that people were using Exodus 21:24–25 (the guidelines for a magistrate to punish convicted offenders) as a justification for personal vengeance. However, the command to "turn the other cheek" is not a command to allow someone to beat or rob a person but a command not to take vengeance.

Many spiritual teachers such as Emmet Fox have viewed Jesus Christ as the greatest teacher of metaphysics that has ever lived (a postulate fact); that in his teachings he was attempting to explain to the individuals of the day how to improve their lot in life through practical teachings. The Sermon on the Mount records the details of one such seminar. Despite losing much in translation, as well as using ancient metaphors which are easily misinterpreted in the modern age, the tenets of Jesus's teachings, phrases such as 'resist evil' and 'turn the other cheek' are pure Godly instructions.

Rather than taking 'an eye for an eye', the Lamb of God encourages us to resist evil, because giving our attention to evil just invites more evil into our lives. Likewise, if someone should strike us, rather than retaliating and therefore becoming embroiled in a battle, Jesus encourages us to 'turn the other cheek'. This is not (as some may have interpreted) so that the assailant may strike the other, but indicates that turning and walking away from the potential altercation is the only way to get a positive and Christ-like outcome. Violence begets more violence.

If we focus on any selfish, sinful thought, word or deed, it only increases its power and presence in our lives. By asking us to turn the other cheek, our King Yeshua is suggesting we focus on forgiveness and loving others, rather than just the things we want.

God

• To know that God exists (Ex. 20:2; Deut. 5:6) (CCA1).

• Not to entertain the idea that there is any god but the Eternal (Ex. 20:3) (CCN8).

• Not to blaspheme (Ex. 22:27; in Christian texts, Ex. 22:28), the penalty for which is death (Lev. 24:16) (negative).

• To hallow God's name (Lev. 22:32) (CCA5).

• Not to profane God's name (Lev . 22:32) (CCN155).

• To know that God is One, a complete Unity (Deut. 6:4) (CCA2).

• To love God (Deut. 6:5) (CCA3).

• To fear Him reverently (Deut. 6:13; 10:20) (CCA4).

• Not to put the word of G-d to the test (Deut. 6:16) (negative).

• To imitate His good and upright ways (Deut. 28:9) (CCA6).
  

Torah

• To honor the old and the wise (Lev. 19:32) (CCA17).

• To learn Torah and to teach it (Deut. 6:7) (CCA14).

• To cleave to those who know Him (Deut. 10:20) (the Talmud states that cleaving to scholars is equivalent to cleaving to Him) (CCA16).

• Not to add to the commandments of the Torah, whether in the Written Law or in its interpretation received by tradition (Deut. 13:1) (CCN159).

• Not to take away from the commandments of the Torah (Deut. 13:1) (CCN160).

• That every person shall write a scroll of the Torah for himself (Deut. 31:19) (CCA15).
  

Signs & Seasons

• To circumcise the male offspring (Gen. 17:12; Lev. 12:3) (CCA47).

• To put tzitzit on the corners of clothing (Num. 15:38) (CCA10).

• To bind tefillin on the head (Deut. 6:8) (CCA9).

• To bind tefillin on the arm (Deut. 6:8) (CCA8).

• To affix the mezuzah to the doorposts and gates of your house (Deut. 6:9) (CCA12).
  

Prayers & Blessings

• To pray to God (Ex. 23:25; Deut. 6:13) (according to the Talmud, the word "serve" in these verses refers to prayer) (CCA7).

• To read the Shema in the morning and at night (Deut. 6:7) (CCA11).

• To recite grace after meals (Deut. 8:10) (CCA13).

• Not to lay down a stone for worship (Lev. 26:1) (CCN161).
  

Love & Brotherhood

• Love all human beings unconditionally, as Christ has loved you.

• Not to stand by idly when a human life is in danger (Lev. 19:16) (CCN82).

• Not to wrong any one in speech (Lev. 25:17) (CCN48).

• Not to carry tales (Lev. 19:16) (CCN77).

• Not to cherish hatred in one's heart (Lev. 19:17) (CCN78).

• Not to take revenge (Lev. 19:18) (CCN80).

• Not to bear a grudge (Lev. 19:18) (CCN81).

• Not to put any Israelite to shame (Lev. 19:17) (CCN79).

• Not to curse any other Israelite (Lev. 19:14) (by implication: if you may not curse those who cannot hear, you certainly may not curse those who can) (CCN45).

• Not to give occasion to the simple-minded to stumble on the road (Lev. 19:14) (this includes doing anything that will cause another to sin) (CCN76).

• To rebuke the sinner (Lev. 19:17) (CCA72).

• To relieve a neighbor of his burden and help to unload his beast (Ex. 23:5) (CCA70).

• To assist in replacing the load upon a neighbor's beast (Deut. 22:4) (CCA71).

• Not to leave a beast, that has fallen down beneath its burden, unaided (Deut. 22:4) (CCN183).
  

Poor & Unfortunate

• Not to afflict an orphan or a widow (Ex. 22:21) (CCN51).

• Not to reap the entire field (Lev. 19:9; Lev. 23:22) (negative) (CCI6).

• To leave the unreaped corner of the field or orchard for the poor (Lev. 19:9) (affirmative) (CCI1).

• Not to gather gleanings (the ears that have fallen to the ground while reaping) (Lev. 19:9) (negative) (CCI7).

• To leave the gleanings for the poor (Lev. 19:9) (affirmative) (CCI2).

• Not to gather ol'loth (the imperfect clusters) of the vineyard (Lev. 19:10) (negative) (CCI8).

• To leave ol'loth (the imperfect clusters) of the vineyard for the poor (Lev. 19:10; Deut. 24:21) (affirmative) (CCI3).

• Not to gather the peret (grapes) that have fallen to the ground (Lev. 19:10) (negative) (CCI9).

• To leave peret (the single grapes) of the vineyard for the poor (Lev. 19:10) (affirmative) (CCI4).

• Not to return to take a forgotten sheaf (Deut. 24:19) This applies to all fruit trees (Deut. 24:20) (negative) (CC10).

• To leave the forgotten sheaves for the poor (Deut. 24:19-20) (affirmative) (CCI5).

• Not to refrain from maintaining a poor man and giving him what he needs (Deut. 15:7) (CCN62).

• To give charity according to one's means (Deut. 15:11) (CCA38).
  

Treatment of Gentiles

• To love the stranger (Deut. 10:19) (CCA61).

• Not to wrong the stranger in speech (Ex. 22:20) (CCN49).

• Not to wrong the stranger in buying or selling (Ex. 22:20) (CCN50).

• Not to intermarry with pagans (Deut. 7:3) (CCN19).

• To exact the debt of an alien (Deut. 15:3) (affirmative).

• To lend to an alien at interest (Deut. 23:21)
  

Marriage, Divorce, & Family

• To honor father and mother (Ex. 20:12) (CCA41).

• Not to smite a father or a mother (Ex. 21:15) (CCN44).

• Not to curse a father or mother (Ex. 21:17) (CCN46).

• To reverently fear father and mother (Lev. 19:3) (CCA42).

• To be fruitful and multiply (Gen. 1:28) (CCA43).

• That a eunuch shall not marry a daughter of Israel (Deut. 23:2) (CCN136).

• That a mamzer shall not marry the daughter of a Jew (Deut. 23:3) (CCN137).

• That an Ammonite or Moabite shall never marry the daughter of an Israelite (Deut. 23:4) (negative).

• Not to exclude a descendant of Esau from the community of Israel for three generations (Deut. 23:8-9) (negative).

• Not to exclude an Egyptian from the community of Israel for three generations (Deut. 23:8-9) (negative).

• That there shall be no harlot (in Israel); that is, that there shall be no intercourse with a woman, without previous marriage with a deed of marriage and formal declaration of marriage (Deut. 23:18) (CCN133).

• To take a wife by kiddushin, the sacrament of marriage (Deut. 24:1) (CCA44).

• That the newly married husband shall (be free) for one year to rejoice with his wife (Deut. 24:5) (affirmative).

• That a bridegroom shall be exempt for a whole year from taking part in any public labor, such as military service, guarding the wall and similar duties (Deut. 24:5) (negative).

• Not to withhold food, clothing, or conjugal rights from a wife (Ex. 21:10) (CCN42).

• That the woman suspected of adultery shall be dealt with as prescribed in the Torah (Num. 5:30) (affirmative).

• That one who defames his wife's honor (by falsely accusing her of unchastity before marriage) must live with her all his lifetime (Deut. 22:19) (affirmative).

• That a man may not divorce his wife concerning whom he has published an evil report (about her unchastity before marriage) (Deut. 22:19) (negative).

• To divorce by a formal written document (Deut. 24:1) (affirmative).

• That one who divorced his wife shall not remarry her, if after the divorce she had been married to another man (Deut. 24:4) (CCN134).

• That a widow whose husband died childless must not be married to anyone but her deceased husband's brother (Deut. 25:5) (CCN135).

• To marry the widow of a brother who has died childless (Deut. 25:5) (this is only in effect insofar as it requires the procedure of release below ) (CCA45).

• That the widow formally release the brother-in-law (if he refuses to marry her) (Deut. 25:7-9) (CCA46).
  

Forbidden Sexual Relations

• Not to indulge in familiarities with relatives, such as kissing, embracing, winking, skipping, which may lead to incest (Lev. 18:6) (CCN110).

• Not to commit incest with one's mother (Lev. 18:7) (CCN112).

• Not to commit sodomy with one's father (Lev. 18:7) (CCN111).

• Not to commit incest with one's father's wife (Lev. 18:8) (CCN113).

• Not to commit incest with one's sister (Lev. 18:9) (CCN127).

• Not to commit incest with one's father's wife's daughter (Lev. 18:11) (CCN128).

• Not to commit incest with one's son's daughter (Lev. 18:10) (CCN119).

• Not to commit incest with one's daughter's daughter (Lev. 18:10) (CCN119).

• Not to commit incest with one's daughter (this is not explicitly in the Torah but is inferred from other explicit commands that would include it) (CCN120).

• Not to commit incest with one's fathers sister (Lev. 18:12) (CCN129).

• Not to commit incest with one's mother's sister (Lev. 18:13) (CCN130).

• Not to commit incest with one's father's brothers wife (Lev. 18:14) (CCN125).

• Not to commit sodomy with one's father's brother (Lev. 18:14) (CCN114).

• Not to commit incest with one's son's wife (Lev. 18:15) (CCN115).

• Not to commit incest with one's brother's wife (Lev. 18:16) (CCN126).

• Not to commit incest with one's wife's daughter (Lev. 18:17) (CCN121).

• Not to commit incest with the daughter of one's wife's son (Lev. 18:17) (CCN122).

• Not to commit incest with the daughter of one's wife's daughter (Lev. 18:17) (CCN123).

• Not to commit incest with one's wife's sister (Lev. 18:18) (CCN131).

• Not to have intercourse with a woman, in her menstrual period (Lev. 18:19) (CCN132).

• Not to have intercourse with another man's wife (Lev. 18:20) (CCN124).

• Not to commit sodomy with a male (Lev. 18:22) (CCN116).

• Not to have intercourse with a beast (Lev. 18:23) (CCN117).

• That a woman shall not have intercourse with a beast (Lev. 18:23) (CCN118).

• Not to castrate the male of any species; neither a man, nor a domestic or wild beast, nor a fowl (Lev. 22:24) (CCN143).
  

Times & Seasons

• That the new month shall be solemnly proclaimed as holy, and the months and years shall be calculated by the Supreme Court only (Ex. 12:2) (affirmative) (the authority to declare months is inferred from the use of the word "unto you").

• Not to travel on Shabbat outside the limits of one's place of residence (Ex. 16:29) (CCN7).

• To sanctify Shabbat (Ex. 20:8) (CCA19).

• Not to do work on Shabbat (Ex. 20:10) (CCN6).

• To rest on Shabbat (Ex. 23:12; 34:21) (CCA20).

• To celebrate the festivals [Passover, Shavu'ot and Sukkot] (Ex. 23:14) (affirmative).

• To rejoice on the festivals (Deut. 16:14) (CCA21).

• To appear in the Sanctuary on the festivals (Deut. 16:16) (affirmative).

• To remove chametz on the Eve of Passover (Ex. 12:15) (CCA22).

• To rest on the first day of Passover (Ex. 12:16; Lev. 23:7) (CCA25).

• Not to do work on the first day of Passover (Ex. 12:16; Lev. 23:6-7) (CCN147).

• To rest on the seventh day of Passover (Ex. 12:16; Lev. 23:8) (CCA27).

• Not to do work on the seventh day of Passover (Ex. 12:16; Lev. 23:8) (CCN148).

• To eat matzah on the first night of Passover (Ex. 12:18) (CCA23).

• That no chametz be in the Israelite's possession during Passover (Ex. 12:19) (CCN3).

• Not to eat any food containing chametz on Passover (Ex. 12:20) (CCN5).

• Not to eat chametz on Passover (Ex. 13:3) (CCN4).

• That chametz shall not be seen in an Israelite's home during Passover (Ex. 13:7) (CCN2).

• To discuss the departure from Egypt on the first night of Passover (Ex. 13:8) (CCA24).

• To take Holy Communion during Passover (Jn. 6:53-56).

• Not to eat chametz after mid-day on the fourteenth of Nissan (Deut. 16:3) (CCN104).

• To count forty-nine days from the time of the cutting of the Omer (first sheaves of the barley harvest) (Lev. 23:15) (CCA26).

• To rest on Shavu'ot (Lev. 23:21) (CCA28).

• Not to do work on the Shavu'ot (Lev. 23:21) (CCN149).

• To rest on Rosh Hashanah (Lev. 23:24) (CCA29).

• Not to do work on Rosh Hashanah (Lev. 23:25) (CCN150).

• To hear the sound of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah (Num. 29:1) (CCA30).

• To fast on Yom Kippur (Lev. 23:27) (CCA32).

• Not to eat or drink on Yom Kippur (Lev. 23:29) (CCN152).

• Not to do work on Yom Kippur (Lev. 23:31) (CCN151).

• To rest on the Yom Kippur (Lev. 23:32) (CCA31).

• To rest on the first day of Sukkot (Lev. 23:35) (CCA34).

• Not to do work on the first day of Sukkot (Lev. 23:35) (CCN153).

• To rest on the eighth day of Sukkot (Shemini Atzeret) (Lev. 23:36) (CCA37).

• Not to do work on the eighth day of Sukkot (Shemini Atzeret) (Lev. 23:36) (CCN154).

• To take during Sukkot a palm branch and the other three plants (Lev. 23:40) (CCA36).

• To dwell in booths seven days during Sukkot (Lev. 23:42) (CCA35).
  

Dietary Laws

• To examine the marks in cattle (so as to distinguish the clean from the unclean) (Lev. 11:2) (affirmative).

• No specie of land nor air animal is "unclean" per Divine decree (Ac. 10:11-16) (affirmative).

• To examine the marks in fishes (so as to distinguish the clean from the unclean (Lev. 11:9) (affirmative).

• Not to eat unclean fish (Lev. 11:11) (CCN95).

• To examine the marks in fowl, so as to distinguish the clean from the unclean (Deut. 14:11) (affirmative).

• Not to eat unclean fowl (Lev. 11:13) (CCN94). See Animals that may not be eaten.

• To examine the marks in locusts, so as to distinguish the clean from the unclean (Lev. 11:21) (affirmative).

• Not to eat a worm found in fruit (Lev. 11:41) (CCN98).

• Not to eat things that swarm in the water (Lev. 11:43 and 46) (CCN99).

• Not to eat the flesh of a beast that is terefah (lit torn) (Ex. 22:30) (CCN87).

• Not to eat the flesh of a beast that died of itself (Deut. 14:21) (CCN86).

• To slay cattle, deer and fowl according to the laws of shechitah if their flesh is to be eaten (Deut. 12:21) ("as I have commanded" in this verse refers to the technique) (CCA48).

• Not to eat a limb removed from a living beast (Deut. 12:23) (CCN90).

• Not to slaughter an animal and its young on the same day (Lev. 22:28) (CCN108).

• Not to take the mother-bird with the young (Deut. 22:6) (CCN189).

• To set the mother-bird free when taking the nest (Deut. 22:6-7) (CCA74).

• Not to eat the flesh of an ox that was condemned to be stoned (Ex. 21:28) (negative).

• Not to boil meat with milk (Ex. 23:19) (CCN91).

• Not to eat flesh with milk (Ex. 34:26) (according to the Talmud, this passage is a distinct prohibition from the one in Ex. 23:19) (CCN92).

• Not to eat the of the thigh-vein which shrank (Gen. 32:33) (CCN1).

• To cover the blood of undomesticated animals (deer, etc.) and of fowl that have been killed (Lev. 17:13) (CCA49).

• Not to eat or drink like a glutton or a drunkard (not to rebel against father or mother) (Lev. 19:26; Deut. 21:20) (CCN106).
  

Business Practices

• Not to do wrong in buying or selling (Lev. 25:14) (CCN47).

• Not to make a loan to an Israelite on interest (Lev. 25:37) (CCN54).

• Not to borrow on interest (Deut. 23:20) (because this would cause the lender to sin) (CCN55).

• Not to take part in any usurious transaction between borrower and lender, neither as a surety, nor as a witness, nor as a writer of the bond for them (Ex. 22:24) (CCN53).

• To lend to a poor person (Ex. 22:24) (even though the passage says "if you lend" it is understood as obligatory) (CCA62).

• Not to demand from a poor man repayment of his debt, when the creditor knows that he cannot pay, nor press him (Ex. 22:24) (CCN52).

• Not to take in pledge utensils used in preparing food (Deut. 24:6) (CCN58).

• Not to exact a pledge from a debtor by force (Deut. 24:10) (CCN59).

• Not to keep the pledge from its owner at the time when he needs it (Deut. 24:12) (CCN61).

• To return a pledge to its owner (Deut. 24:13) (CCA63).

• Not to take a pledge from a widow (Deut. 24:17) (CCN60).

• Not to commit fraud in measuring (Lev. 19:35) (CCN83).

• To ensure that scales and weights are correct (Lev. 19:36) (affirmative).

• Not to possess inaccurate measures and weights (Deut. 25:13-14) (CCN84).
  

Employees, Servants & Slaves

• Not to delay payment of a hired man's wages (Lev. 19:13) (CCN38).

• That the hired laborer shall be permitted to eat of the produce he is reaping (Deut. 23:25-26) (CCA65).

• That the hired laborer shall not take more than he can eat (Deut. 23:25) (CCN187).

• That a hired laborer shall not eat produce that is not being harvested (Deut. 23:26) (CCN186).

• To pay wages to the hired man at the due time (Deut. 24:15) (CCA66).

• To deal judicially with the Hebrew bondman in accordance with the laws appertaining to him (Ex. 21:2-6) (affirmative).

• Not to compel the Hebrew servant to do the work of a slave (Lev. 25:39) (negative).

• Not to sell a Hebrew servant as a slave (Lev. 25:42) (negative).

• Not to treat a Hebrew servant rigorously (Lev. 25:43) (negative).

• Not to permit a gentile to treat harshly a Hebrew bondman sold to him (Lev. 25:53) (negative).

• Not to send away a Hebrew bondman servant empty handed, when he is freed from service (Deut. 15:13) (negative).

• To bestow liberal gifts upon the Hebrew bondsman (at the end of his term of service), and the same should be done to a Hebrew bondwoman (Deut. 15:14) (affirmative).

• To redeem a Hebrew maid-servant (Ex. 21:8) (affirmative).

• Not to sell a Hebrew maid-servant to another person (Ex. 21:8) (negative).

• To espouse a Hebrew maid-servant (Ex. 21:8-9) (affirmative).

• To keep the Canaanite slave forever (Lev. 25:46) (affirmative).

• Not to surrender a slave, who has fled to the land of Israel, to his owner who lives outside Palestine (Deut. 23:16) (negative).

• Not to wrong such a slave (Deut. 23:17) (negative).

• Not to muzzle a beast, while it is working in produce which it can eat and enjoy (Deut. 25:4) (CCN188).
  

Vows, Oaths & Swearing

• That a man should fulfill whatever he has uttered (Deut. 23:24) (CCA39).

• Not to swear needlessly (Ex. 20:7) (CCN29).

• Not to violate an oath or swear falsely (Lev. 19:12) (CCN31).

• To decide in cases of annulment of vows, according to the rules set forth in the Torah (Num. 30:2-17) (CCA40).

• Not to break a vow (Num. 30:3) (CCN184).

• To swear by His name truly (Deut. 10:20) (affirmative).

• Not to delay in fulfilling vows or bringing vowed or free-will offerings (Deut. 23:22) (CCN185).
  

The Sabbatical & Jubilee Years

• To let the land lie fallow in the Sabbatical year (Ex. 23:11; Lev. 25:2) (affirmative) (CCI20).

• To cease from tilling the land in the Sabbatical year (Ex. 23:11) (affirmative) (Lev. 25:2) (CCI21).

• Not to till the ground in the Sabbatical year (Lev. 25:4) (negative) (CCI22).

• Not to do any work on the trees in the Sabbatical year (Lev. 25:4) (negative) (CCI23).

• Not to reap the aftermath that grows in the Sabbatical year, in the same way as it is reaped in other years (Lev. 25:5) (negative) (CCI24).

• Not to gather the fruit of the tree in the Sabbatical year in the same way as it is gathered in other years (Lev. 25:5) (negative) (CCI25).

• To sound the Ram's horn in the Sabbatical year (Lev. 25:9) (affirmative).

• To release debts in the seventh year (Deut. 15:2) (CCA64).

• Not to demand return of a loan after the Sabbatical year has passed (Deut. 15:2) (CCN57).

• Not to refrain from making a loan to a poor man, because of the release of loans in the Sabbatical year (Deut. 15:9) (CCN56).

• To assemble the people to hear the Torah at the close of the seventh year (Deut. 31:12) (affirmative)

• To count the years of the Jubilee by years and by cycles of seven years (Lev. 25:8) (affirmative).

• To keep the Jubilee year holy by resting and letting the land lie fallow (Lev. 25:10) (affirmative).

• Not to cultivate the soil nor do any work on the trees, in the Jubilee Year (Lev. 25:11) (negative).

• Not to reap the aftermath of the field that grew of itself in the Jubilee Year, in the same way as in other years (Lev. 25:11) (negative).

• Not to gather the fruit of the tree in the Jubilee Year, in the same way as in other years (Lev. 25:11) (negative).

• To grant redemption to the land in the Jubilee year (Lev. 25:24) (affirmative).
  

The Court & Judicial Procedure

• To appoint judges and officers in every community of Israel (Deut. 16:18) (affirmative).

• Not to appoint as a judge, a person who is not well versed in the laws of the Torah, even if he is expert in other branches of knowledge (Deut. 1:17) (CCN64).

• To adjudicate cases of purchase and sale (Lev. 25:14) (CCA67).

• To judge cases of liability of a paid depositary (Ex. 22:9) (affirmative).

• To adjudicate cases of loss for which a gratuitous borrower is liable (Ex. 22:13-14) (affirmative).

• To adjudicate cases of inheritances (Num. 27:8-11) (CCA73).

• To judge cases of damage caused by an uncovered pit (Ex. 21:33-34) (affirmative).

• To judge cases of injuries caused by beasts (Ex. 21:35-36) (affirmative).

• To adjudicate cases of damage caused by trespass of cattle (Ex. 22:4) (affirmative).

• To adjudicate cases of damage caused by fire (Ex. 22:5) (affirmative).

• To adjudicate cases of damage caused by a gratuitous depositary (Ex. 22:6-7) (affirmative).

• To adjudicate other cases between a plaintiff and a defendant (Ex. 22:8) (affirmative).

• Not to curse a judge (Ex. 22:27) (CCN63).

• That one who possesses evidence shall testify in Court (Lev. 5:1) (affirmative).

• Not to testify falsely (Ex. 20:13) (CCN39).

• That a witness, who has testified in a capital case, shall not lay down the law in that particular case (Num. 35:30) (negative).

• That a transgressor shall not testify (Ex. 23:1) (CCN75).

• That the court shall not accept the testimony of a close relative of the defendant in matters of capital punishment (Deut. 24:16) (CCN74).

• Not to hear one of the parties to a suit in the absence of the other party (Ex. 23:1) (CCN65).

• To examine witnesses thoroughly (Deut. 13:15) (affirmative).

• Not to decide a case on the evidence of a single witness (Deut. 19:15) (CCN73).

• To give the decision according to the majority, when there is a difference of opinion among the members of the Sanhedrin as to matters of law (Ex. 23:2) (affirmative).

• Not to decide, in capital cases, according to the view of the majority, when those who are for condemnation exceed by one only, those who are for acquittal (Ex. 23:2) (negative).

• That, in capital cases, one who had argued for acquittal, shall not later on argue for condemnation (Ex. 23:2) (negative).

• To treat parties in a litigation with equal impartiality (Lev. 19:15) (affirmative).

• Not to render iniquitous decisions (Lev. 19:15) (CCN69).

• Not to favor a great man when trying a case (Lev. 19:15) (CCN70).

• Not to take a bribe (Ex. 23:8) (CCN71).

• Not to be afraid of a bad man, when trying a case (Deut. 1:17) (CCN72).

• Not to be moved in trying a case, by the poverty of one of the parties (Ex. 23:3; Lev. 19:15) (CCN66).

• Not to pervert the judgment of strangers or orphans (Deut. 24:17) (CCN68).

• Not to pervert the judgment of a sinner (a person poor in fulfillment of commandments) (Ex. 23:6) (CCN67).

• Not to render a decision on one's personal opinion, but only on the evidence of two witnesses, who saw what actually occurred (Ex. 23:7) (negative).

• Not to execute one guilty of a capital offense, before he has stood his trial (Num. 35:12) (negative).

• To accept the rulings of every Supreme Court in Israel (Deut. 17:11) (affirmative).

• Not to rebel against the orders of the Court (Deut. 17:11) (CCN158).
  

Injuries & Damages

• To make a parapet for your roof (Deut. 22:8) (CCA75).

• Not to leave something that might cause hurt (Deut. 22:8) (CCN190).

• To save the pursued even at the cost of the life of the pursuer (Deut. 25:12) (affirmative).

• Not to spare a pursuer, but he is to be slain before he reaches the pursued and slays the latter, or uncovers his nakedness (Deut. 25:12) (negative).
  

Property & Property Rights

• Not to sell a field in the land of Israel in perpetuity (Lev. 25:23) (negative).

• Not to change the character of the open land (about the cities of) the Levites or of their fields; not to sell it in perpetuity, but it may be redeemed at any time (Lev. 25:34) (negative).

• That houses sold within a walled city may be redeemed within a year (Lev. 25:29) (affirmative).

• Not to remove landmarks (property boundaries) (Deut. 19:14) (CCN85).

• Not to swear falsely in denial of another's property rights (Lev. 19:11) (CCN30).

• Not to deny falsely another's property rights (Lev. 19:11) (CCN36).

• Never to settle in the land of Egypt (Deut. 17:16) (CCN192).

• Not to steal personal property (Lev. 19:11) (CCN34).

• To restore that which one took by robbery (Lev. 5:23) (CCA68).

• To return lost property (Deut. 22:1) (CCA69).

• Not to pretend not to have seen lost property, to avoid the obligation to return it (Deut. 22:3) (CCN182).
  

Criminal Laws

• Not to slay an innocent person (Ex. 20:13) (CCN32).

• Not to kidnap any person of Israel (Ex. 20:13) (according to the Talmud, this verse refers to stealing a person, distinguished from Lev. 19:11, regarding the taking of property) (CCN33).

• Not to rob by violence (Lev. 19:13) (CCN35).

• Not to defraud (Lev. 19:13) (CCN37).

• Not to covet what belongs to another (Ex. 20:14) (CCN40).

• Not to crave something that belongs to another (Deut. 5:18) (CCN41).

• Not to indulge in evil thoughts and sights (Num. 15:39) (CCN156).